Institutional Innovations for Encouraging Private Sector Investments: Reducing Transaction Costs on the Ethiopian Formal Seed Market by Christine Husmann
Chapter 8
Institutional Innovations for Encouraging
Private Sector Investments: Reducing
Transaction Costs on the Ethiopian Formal
Seed Market
Christine Husmann
Abstract There is a considerable shortage of improved seed in Ethiopia. Despite
good reasons to invest in this market, private sector investments are not occurring.
Using an institutional economics theoretical framework, this chapter analyzes the
formal Ethiopian seed system and identifies transaction costs to find potential
starting points for institutional innovations. Analyzing data from more than
50 expert interviews conducted in Ethiopia, it appears that transaction costs are
high along the whole seed value chain and mainly born by the government, as
public organizations dominate the Ethiopian seed system, leaving little room for the
private sector. However, recent direct marketing pilots are a signal of careful efforts
towards market liberalization.
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Introduction
About 80 % of the Ethiopian population depend as smallholder farmers on agricul-
ture for their livelihoods (CSA 2012a). These smallholders suffer from a very low
productivity (see, e.g., Seyoum Taffesse et al. 2011). To increase productivity,
improved inputs like seeds, fertilizer and better farming practices are crucial
(see, e.g., von Braun et al. 1992; Conway 2012).
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Despite the presence of several seed companies, the agricultural input sector in
Ethiopia is currently unable to satisfy the demand for improved seed in the country
(Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 2013). However, there are several reasons to invest
in Ethiopian agricultural input markets: not only is the market large in terms of
the number of people, high rates of economic growth and investments in infrastruc-
ture indicate huge potential, especially in the middle and long runs. Furthermore, in
the last two decades, innovative business approaches have emerged that add social as
well as financial returns to a company’s bottom line, and thus augment the reasons for
companies to invest in poor countries and poor people (Baumu¨ller et al. 2013).
Empirical studies suggest that the current situation in Ethiopian agricultural
input markets is not the efficient outcome of demand and supply meeting at a
certain price, but that institutions drive up transaction costs, i.e., the “costs of
coordinating resources through market arrangements” (Demsetz 1995, p. 4), lead-
ing to insufficient supply of and unmet demand for agricultural inputs (Alemu 2011,
2010; Bishaw et al. 2008; Louwaars 2010; Spielman et al. 2011). From a theoretical
perspective of allocation, this situation is a market failure, since the lack of supply
of agricultural inputs at current prices implies welfare outcomes below an achiev-
able optimum. Thus, the current lack of inputs can be defined as a market failure in
this sense (see Arrow 1969; Bator 1958 for detailed discussions of this argument).
Market failures are a result of high transaction costs. Transaction costs, however,
are determined by the institutional structure of an economy (North 1989). North
(1990) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally,
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, p. 3).
The free market cannot serve as the fictive first best option whose approximation
can guide the design of an institutional setting, since transaction costs drive a wedge
between producer and consumer prices such that, even in theory, ‘free markets’
do not lead to Pareto efficient results when transaction costs are taken into account
(Arrow 1969; Demsetz 1969). Thus, a comparative approach evaluating real alter-
native institutional arrangements based on the identification of the relevant trans-
action costs that determine economic performance is appropriate for studying
transaction costs and the functioning of markets (Williamson 1980; Demsetz
1969; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
Against this background, an analysis of the institutional setting and the transac-
tion costs arising for agricultural input markets is carried out to get a better
understanding of the reasons for the observed market failure and to assess possible
solutions for these frictions. Only if these costs are reduced is there a chance that the
private sector can expand activities to make improved seed accessible to the poor
as well.
Transaction cost economics has been applied to study many different problems
of economic organization. Masten (2001) stresses the importance of transaction
cost economics for the analysis of agricultural markets and policy, as well as vice
versa, the potential that the analysis of agricultural markets has for refining trans-
action cost theory (see also Kherallah and Kirsten 2002).
Transaction costs are generally found to be high on agricultural markets in poor
countries and have a considerable influence on farmers’ marketing decisions.
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Several studies show that transaction costs are closely related to distance and that
distance from markets negatively influences market participation and thus incomes
(Alene et al. 2008; de Bruyn et al. 2001; Holloway et al. 2000; Kyeyamwa
et al. 2008; Maltsoglou and Tanyeri-Abur 2005; Ouma et al. 2010; Rujis
et al. 2004; Somda et al. 2005; Staal et al. 1997; Stifel et al. 2003). More
specifically, Staal et al. (1997) find that transaction costs rise in greater proportion
than transportation costs due to factors such as increasing costs of information and
risk of spoilage of agricultural products. Furthermore, costs of information and
research are found to impact smallholders’ marketing decisions (Gabre-Madhin
2001; Staal et al. 1997; de Bruyn et al. 2001; De Silva and Ratnadiwakara 2008;
Kyeyamwa et al. 2008; Key et al. 2000; Maltsoglou and Tanyeri-Abur 2005).
However, Holloway (2000) and Staal et al. (1997) find a positive effect from
organizations of collective action, such as cooperatives, in reducing transaction
costs. These benefits accrue to both producers and buyers, as cooperatives reduce
the cost of information for both sides and take advantage of economies of scales in
collection and transport.
Less is known about transaction costs arising on the side of the private sector
when companies try to market to poor smallholders. Recent studies engaged in
initial analysis of constraints for companies entering agricultural markets in poor
countries remain vague, but indicate that “(a) laws, policies or regulations that
constrain business operations; (b) government capacity to respond quickly; and
(c) access to capital” are the main hurdles named by the private sector to realizing
investments in African agriculture (New Alliance for Food Security & Nutrition
2013, p. 6).
Against this background, the following chapter begins to fill this knowledge gap
by analyzing the institutional setting and the resulting transaction costs that arise
when selling improved seed to poor farmers in Ethiopia. The study uses primary
data obtained through expert interviews that were conducted by the author in
Ethiopia in 2011, 2012 and 2013. These interviews are analyzed concerning the
importance of different types of transaction costs in providing incentives and
disincentives to expand seed production. To ensure anonymity for the informants,
only the stakeholder group of the informant is provided in the text in square
brackets. Thus, if one or more experts from a stakeholder group provided informa-
tion, this is indicated in the citation in the following way: [1] manager of an
international seed company; [2] manager of a private Ethiopian seed company;
[3] manager of a public Ethiopian seed company; [4] member of a farmer’s
organization; [5] government employee; [6] employee of a public research organi-
zation; [7] employee of another organization (banks, Agricultural Transformation
Agency, etc.).
Results show that the formal Ethiopian seed system is largely controlled by the
government and public organizations. Based on a de facto monopoly of breeder
seed, the government forces seed companies to market all seed through one
government-controlled distribution channel, at prices determined by the govern-
ment. This limits profit margins and incentives to expand seed production. The only
exception to this system are the international seed companies that operate in
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Ethiopia, as these produce their own varieties and are thus not dependent on the
breeder seed provided by the public research institutions. Thus, the government
bears especially high transaction costs to sustain a system that does not lead to
satisfactory outcomes. However, direct marketing pilots have been started that
allow Ethiopian seed companies to market their seed directly to farmers for the
first time, which may indicate a first step towards market liberalization.
Seed Production in Ethiopia
In the following, only the case of seeds of major crops is discussed. These major
crops are 18 crops selected by the Ethiopian government: teff, barley, wheat, maize,
sorghum, finger millet, rice, faba (fava) bean, field pea, haricot bean, chickpea,
lentil, soybean, niger seed, linseed, groundnut, sesame and mustard. Institutions
differ for other seeds, such as fruit and vegetable seeds, and for other agricultural
inputs like fertilizer or agrochemicals. However, due to space limitations, only the
circumstances concerning the 18 major crops are discussed below.
Only 2.9 % of the farmers in Ethiopia reported using improved seed in 2011
(CSA and MoFED 2011, p. 20). The contribution of the formal seed sector as a
percentage of cultivated land was only 5.4 % in 2011, with considerable variability
among different crops (Spielman et al. 2011). Low technology adoption rates can
occur for many reasons (Degu et al. 2000; Feder and Umali 1993). In Ethiopia, one
important reason is the substantial lack of improved seed (see MoA 2013).
In 2011/2012, seed supply covered only 51 % of stated demand for barley, 24 %
for wheat, 16 % for rice, 30 % for millet and 60 % for faba bean (MoA 2013). The
supply of maize, wheat and teff seeds has improved considerably over recent years.
But still, only 20 % of the area cultivated with maize, 4 % of the wheat area and less
than 1 % of the teff area are cultivated with seed from the formal sector
(CSA 2012b).
In the Ethiopian case, it is important to distinguish between different types of
seed companies. Generally, in this chapter, a private seed company is understood as
a firm with a business and a seed producing license, producing seed on its own
account and bearing the full risk of the business. Thus, cooperative unions or
farmers employed as seed producers by seed companies, or other organizations
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), do not fall into this category.
However, this does not imply that seed companies produce all their seed them-
selves, companies can also hire farmers to produce the seed on their behalf.
For the following analysis, it is helpful to differentiate between public seed
enterprises, private Ethiopian seed enterprises and international (private) seed
enterprises. There are five public seed companies in Ethiopia: the Ethiopian Seed
Enterprise (ESE), the Amhara Seed Enterprise (ASE), the Oromia Seed Enterprise
(OSE), the South Seed Enterprise (SSE) and the Somali Seed Enterprise. The ESE
was the only seed company in the country for several decades before some private
seed companies entered the market. The regional public seed enterprises were
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established recently, starting with ASE and OSE in 2009. Their statutes foresee
them producing different kind of seeds for Ethiopian farmers without profit-making
being a primary goal (Amhara Regional State 2008).
The number of private Ethiopian seed enterprises is not clear. In 2004, 26 firms
were licensed to produce seed but only eight firms were active in seed production
(Byerlee et al. 2007). Other sources mention 33 seed producing companies but
without specifying who they are (Atilaw and Korbu 2012). In 2011, 16 private seed
enterprises were listed in the business directory, but it is not clear whether they were
all operating at that time.
Two international seed enterprises are producing some of the selected major
crops (as at July 2013), Hi-Bred Pioneer and Seed Co. Both focus on the production
of hybrid maize, while one of them also produces smaller quantities of wheat, teff
and beans ([1]).
Why Is There Not More Investment in Seed Production?
If the stated demand is much higher than seed production, the question arises as to
what is preventing private seed companies from increasing investments in seed
production to tap this market. The answer to this question lies in the institutional
setting governing seed production and distribution in Ethiopia.
As illustrated in Fig. 8.1, the Ethiopian seed system is quite complex. The
process of seed production starts with an assessment of seed demand, which is
carried out by the Development Agents (DAs) on kebele (village) level. Information
about seed demand is then passed up the governmental administrative ladder and
collected by the Bureaus of Agriculture (BoA) and the MoA. On the basis of this
information, the MoA orders production of quantities of various crops at the ESE,
while the BoAs determine production portfolios for the regional public seed
enterprises and the private seed companies in the area.
All Ethiopian seed companies – public and private – get their pre-basic and basic
seed from public research institutes (see also Fig. 8.1). Only the two international
seed companies operate with their own varieties. This is of great importance,
because getting pre-basic seed from national research institutes comes with a
contract entailing a clause that obliges the companies to sell all produced seed
back to the government – at prices to be determined by the government and often
announced on short notice.
The MoA determines the quantities of seed to be distributed to each region on
the basis of the demand assessment; the BoAs define the quantities for each zone,
and so forth. Seed distribution is usually managed by farmer cooperative unions,
who bring the seed to the zones and the primary (multipurpose) cooperatives that
pick the seed up in the zonal warehouses and bring it to the woredas (districts) and
kebeles. Unions charge for transport, uploading and unloading, but they make only
small profits from seed distribution, with profit margins being determined by the
regional governments ([3]; [4]).
8 Institutional Innovations for Encouraging Private Sector Investments. . . 129
An important implication of this seed system is the lack of agro-dealers, as seed
distribution is organized in one government-controlled distribution channel. This
also has important implications for other agro-dealers, as it makes it extremely
difficult and expensive for them to market agricultural inputs outside larger
agglomerations.
The private seed enterprises in Ethiopia mainly focus on hybrid maize produc-
tion because it offers the highest profit margins. For this reason, supply of hybrid
maize seeds has improved considerably since the regional seed enterprises started
operation, from 88,000 quintals in 2006/2007 to 357,000 quintals
(1 quintal¼ 100 kg) in 2010/2011 (Dalberg Global Development Advisors 2012).
Private companies now produce about 40 % of the hybrid maize seed sold in the
country (Alemu 2011).
Some companies also produce varieties of wheat, teff, beans, rice, soybean,
sesame and sorghum. But all of these crops except hybrid maize are only produced
in very small quantities, despite large cultivation areas. Thus, there are large
untapped markets for these crops where demand is substantially higher than supply
(see Table 8.1; MoA 2013). However, with the limited size of land for seed
production, companies focus on the production of the seed with the highest profit
margin as long as there is demand for that seed.
Fig. 8.1 The formal seed system in Ethiopia (Source: author)
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Institutions Preventing the Private Sector
from Increasing Seed Production
Various institutions in the current seed system prevent private seed companies from
increasing seed production and making it available to smallholders. Important
constraints for the private Ethiopian seed enterprises result from the fact that
none of them do their own breeding. Some managers express the intent of importing
new parental lines for breeding to escape the strict government interference.
However, breeding is a difficult business that requires additional land and high-
skilled and experienced plant breeders, as well as technical facilities. Accordingly,
seed producers need to get more land assigned by the government to start their own
breeding, which takes a long time and is insecure. Additionally, it is difficult to hire
experienced plant breeders in Ethiopia because, currently, plant breeders are gov-
ernment employees enjoying secure jobs and other privileges. Thus, it is difficult to
attract them to private companies. This problem is aggravated by the fact that areas
dedicated to plant breeding are always remote because breeding requires isolated
land plots. These circumstances oblige companies to pay high salaries to plant
breeders, since skilled people often do not want to live in remote areas ([2]).
Moreover, the installation of the necessary technical facilities requires additional
working capital, which is difficult to get.
On the other hand, several experts assume that some seed enterprises are quite
content with the present form of the contracts, because they minimize risks as long
as the government commits itself to buying all produced seed ([7]).
Another institution disadvantaging private Ethiopian seed companies is related
to the distribution of seed. Farmers can select the varieties they want to purchase,
but they are usually not given the choice to opt for one particular source. It even
often happens that the farmer cooperative unions or the primary cooperatives mix
Table 8.1 Difference between supply and demand of improved seed of various crops
Difference between demand and supply in quintals
(2011/2012)
% of demand not
met
Wheat 200,720 21 %
Teff 10,211 11 %
Maize 39,666 9 %
Barley 101,924 49 %
Sorghum 16,433 92 %
Rice 13,638 84 %
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seed or refill bags from one seed with another to make transportation easier, which
confuses farmers about the quality of seed of different producers ([2]). Two
problems arise as a result: first, this prevents companies from establishing a brand
name, and second, it hampers response to complaints by farmers about seed quality
because the producer of the seed is not clearly identifiable.
Price determination is another point posing major difficulties for the private
Ethiopian seed companies. Compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries, the
seed prices determined by the government are relatively low in Ethiopia. At first
glance, this seems to be beneficial for the farmers but it also has considerable
disadvantages concerning users’ efficiency (Alemu 2010, p. 24) and can lead to a
crowding out of the private sector ([2]). The prices of major crop seeds are
negotiated by the BoAs, the board and the management of the public seed enter-
prises. These prices are then binding for maximum prices for the seed of all
Ethiopian seed enterprises. Prices are based on estimations of farmers’ willingness
to pay for seed, but there is no systematic assessment of farmers’ willingness or
ability to pay (Alemu 2010). Prices vary considerably across regions and from year
to year. In 2011, e.g., hybrid maize BH-540 was sold at 2000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB)
per quintal in Oromia, while in Amhara, the price was 1500 ETB per quintal ([2];
[3]). In the 2010–2011 cropping season, Pioneer Hi-Bred sold its hybrid maize at
2784 ETB per quintal and sold all its stock ([1]).
What Is the Nature of Transaction Costs Arising
in the Ethiopian Seed System?
Although it is not possible to quantify transaction costs resulting out of the
presented institutions in the seed system, since neither the companies nor the
government keep detailed records of their costs, the nature of the transaction
costs involved and the distribution of these costs can be identified.
Costs for market entry have not been high in the past. Until now, it was not
difficult for private companies to start a seed business. Business owners need (1) an
investment license, (2) a competence license and (3) a business license if they
produce the seed on their own land. If the company does not operate on its own land
but hires farmers to produce the seed, it does not need the business license.
Requirements to get the licenses are clear and the application procedure usually
takes only a few weeks ([2]). However, private sector stakeholders fear that pro-
cedures will become more tiresome and lengthy, as the government might want to
suppress additional competition for the regional public seed enterprises ([2]).
International seed enterprises that bring their own varieties face very high
transaction costs for market entry ([1]). Bureaucratic procedures are unclear and
lengthy. New varieties that are brought to the country need to get registered in a
procedure that usually takes 3–4 years ([1]; Dalberg Global Development Advisors
2012).
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Costs for market information and pricing are moderate, since demand is still very
high for improved seed of all crops. For international seed companies marketing
their own varieties, considerable costs arise for promotional activities, since it takes
several years to gain the farmers’ confidence in a new brand. Many field days,
demonstration plots and gratis seed packages are needed to convince farmers of the
benefits of improved seed ([1]).
For Ethiopian seed enterprises, pre-contractual activities are organized by the
government. Although there is no law or regulation fixing it, a de factomonopoly of
the public research institutes implies a monopsony for seed, as the government
obliges the seed companies to sell all seed back to it. The government is then
responsible for the marketing of the seed. In terms of transaction costs, this means
that, for the companies, costs for searching for customers and costs for information
about the market do not arise, because their product portfolio is largely determined
by the government and they have to sell the produced seed to the government. This
is changing with the direct seed marketing pilots (see next section), in which
companies are responsible for demand assessment themselves.
Advertisement costs do not arise for Ethiopian seed companies, since marketing
is done by the government with the help of farmers’ cooperatives, and farmers
cannot chose the source of their seed.
For the government, pre-contractual transaction costs are considerable. Govern-
ment employees spend much time collecting data about seed demand and distrib-
uting seed. The typical time the head of extension in a woreda spends on collecting
seed demand per season is 1 month, i.e., 2 months a year for both cropping seasons,
and 45 days on distributing seed to the farmers ([5]). In the regional BoA of the
Southern National, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNP), for example, five
full-time employees are charged with organizing seed supply and distribution ([5]).
Additionally, employees in the zonal departments of agriculture and in the MoA are
involved, but it is not clear how many people dedicate their working time to seed
distribution there.
Contract formation (bargaining) is similarly simplified for companies, since the
prices of major crop seed are negotiated by the BoA, the board and the management
of the public seed enterprises. Since government regulations avoid direct contact
and contracts between seed companies and farmers, there is no room for negotia-
tions between customers and companies about prices or other parts of the contract
([2]).
The post-contractual transaction activities of contract execution, control, and
enforcement are also minimized for seed companies by the actual government
regulation. The theory of self-enforcing agreements (Furubotn and Richter 2005)
ceases to be valid, since the seller of the seed is not the producer and complaints are
usually not transferred back to the producer. The farmer cannot retaliate by ceasing
to purchase the product if the product turns out to be of bad quality because, first, he
cannot identify the producer, and secondly, because he cannot choose between
different producers, such that the only alternative is not to buy improved seed at all.
As a result, it appears that, in the current situation, transaction costs are mainly
born by the government. Governmental agencies assess demand and organize
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distribution of seed, and public banks finance the time elapsed between seed
delivery by the seed enterprises and payments of the farmers. Promotional activities
are done by the DAs, if at all. These transaction costs are very high and are not
justified by satisfying outcomes in terms of quantities of seed produced, seed
quality and timeliness of delivery.
Rather, the system has considerable disadvantages: cooperatives have to carry
the burden of transporting seed, which keeps them away from other tasks, such as
training for farmers or output marketing, on which they should actually focus ([7]).
The current distribution network is also the reason for the lack of agro-dealers in the
country, which is detrimental for the international seed companies and for other
traders of agricultural inputs.
The Direct Seed Marketing Pilots
Increased pressure from private seed companies and other stakeholders led to the
first trials in which Ethiopian seed companies could directly sell their seed to
farmers. Starting in the Amhara region in 2011 and followed by Oromia and
SNNP in 2012, Ethiopian seed companies were allowed for the first time to directly
market their seed. These pilots have been scaled up in 2013. While in Amhara and
Oromia, the direct seed marketing was restricted to hybrid maize, other varieties
such as wheat could also be directly marketed in five woredas in SNNP.
Preliminary results of the Amhara pilot suggest that seed availability and timely
delivery was better in project woredas than in non-project woredas (Astatike
et al. 2012). The pilot also revealed that demand estimations for the pilot woredas
were quite inaccurate. The project was not reiterated in Amhara in 2012, since the
ASE was left with a lot of unsold seed that the government decided to sell
preferentially in 2012 in the framework of the normal seed distribution system.
Concerning the 2012 direct seed marketing pilot in Oromia and SNNP, prelim-
inary results indicate that all companies were able to sell almost all their seed.
Participating companies in both regions even felt that they could have sold more
seed if they would have had better demand information and fewer difficulties with
transportation and storage in the woredas ([2]; Benson et al. 2014).
Still, in both woredas, more improved seed was sold than in any other year
before, and more than was initially foreseen (ISSD 2013). This might have various
reasons. First, the shops of agro-dealers were open 7 days a week and during the
whole day, while the cooperatives distributing the seed usually only open for two
afternoons a week due to the lack of full-time employees. Secondly, seed was
available on time before planting and until planting was finished. Thus, previously
well-known problems of late arrivals of seed were avoided. Third, agro-dealers are
said to provide good technical advice to farmers. This, together with some promo-
tion by the companies, might have increased awareness and trust in the seed.
Finally, some farmers reported that they also bought seed for their relatives living
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in neighboring woredas who saw the benefits of early seed arrival and technical
advice from the agro-dealers ([2]; [5]).
The main benefits of the pilots can be summarized as:
• Traceability of the seed, and thus increased accountability for seed quality,
which increases farmers’ trust;
• Time resources saved by DAs and Subject Matter Specialists, who were previ-
ously occupied with seed distribution and can now concentrate on training and
advisory services for farmers;
• Farmers do not hold DAs responsible for seed failure, since seed distribution is
now managed by agro-dealers, which considerably improves the relationship
between DAs and farmers;
• Companies are rewarded for better quality, and thus have an incentive to
improve on quality in the future;
• There is less seed fraud and storage damage as the value chain is much shorter.
The direct seed marketing trials can be seen as an important step towards market
liberalization. However, the cessation of the pilot in Amhara shows how fragile
such changes are. Improvements in the methodology and careful evaluations of the
project will be needed to smooth the way towards market liberalization for com-
panies, as well as for farmers.
Despite the generally very positive experience with the recent direct seed
marketing pilots, some difficulties remain. An especially crucial point is the cost
for transportation and agro-dealers. In 2012, sales prices were determined by the
government and companies were not allowed to add up transportation costs and
agro-dealer commissions, despite considerable expenses for long stretches of trans-
port, which drove their profit margins towards zero or even below that. These
problems led some companies to step out of the process. Other challenges are the
lack of storage facilities in the woredas and a lack of trained agro-dealers.
Institutional Innovations to Improve Seed Supply
and Access to Improved Seed
It can be doubted that the relationship between the sum of transaction costs and
outcomes in terms of efficiency of seed production and distribution is optimal in the
Ethiopian system. Of course, it is difficult to evaluate efficiency without a counter-
factual. Yet, the analysis of the seed system reveals that institutions do not govern
the seed market in an optimal manner: despite the high investments of time and
other resources, inaccuracies in the demand assessments regularly lead to deficient
outcomes that distort optimal seed production and distribution. High costs of capital
and other burdens imposed by the government, e.g., concerning variety registration,
prevent Ethiopian seed companies from investing in their own breeding, which
could improve the availability of high-quality seed in the country. Incentives for
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optimizing seed quality are distorted, since farmers cannot identify the source of
their seed and prices are independent from quality. Thus, access to pre-basic seed
and/or support for their own breeding efforts, which would include the assignment
of appropriate land plots and the availability of plant breeders and access to
finance at reasonable costs combined with price incentives, could considerably
improve incentives for private seed companies to increase production, and thus
ameliorate the seed shortage in the country. The direct seed marketing pilots show
that the government has recognized the need for change and may slowly deregulate
the market.
To ensure supply of improved seed of all crops, contributions from the private
sector will be needed. Even if the new regional seed enterprises expand and
optimize their production in the near future, it is unlikely that they can satisfy the
seed demand of all farmers in the country. This is also acknowledged by the
government (World Economic Forum 2012).
In the current system, there is no strong incentive for many seed producers to
begin making themselves more independent from the government. It is uncertain
(for some even unlikely) that their profits would increase much, but business would
become much riskier
To incentivize domestic as well as foreign investment, a well-designed and
stepwise market liberalization is needed. Incremental institutional changes are
required that provide incentives for the private sector to increase seed production
and diversity in the product portfolio and to improve seed quality. Yet, the costs of
such changes in terms of welfare losses of other stakeholders must be carefully
evaluated. Some concrete innovations that are most likely to increase incentives for
the private sector and result in better input supply for farmers in the middle- and
long run are discussed below:
A central aspect for Ethiopian seed companies is that they need access to
pre-basic seed of the varieties and in the quantities of their choice and the ability
to market it in areas and at prices according to their firm strategy. Since public seed
companies are not obliged to make profits according to their statutes, these enter-
prises can ensure that even the marginalized poor have access to improved seed in
case the private companies develop strategies that focus on other market segments.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) or farmer cooperatives need to provide credits
to the farmers. Without a credit facility, a rise in seed production will hardly benefit
the majority of the peasants. MFIs are already serving many farmers but are still far
from being omnipresent. However, extended coverage is needed to back up the
want for improved inputs with purchasing power. The extension of coverage,
however, needs to be accompanied by lending methodologies that ensure repay-
ments to avoid the high default rates that have eroded the credit system in the past.
Access to credit is a decisive factor not only for the farmers but also for the seed
companies if they are to increase seed production and the diversity of varieties.
Collateral requirements and costs for negotiations with the banks need to be
lowered such that seed companies have a realistic chance of accessing finance at
reasonable costs.
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Another fundamental precondition for a more vibrant private sector is the
assignment of more land for seed production and breeding efforts. Yet, more seed
production and especially independent breeding efforts that would free Ethiopian
companies from most governmental control along the value chain also require
high-skilled plant breeders. The education of such people is a long-term task that
needs to be taken care of by the government in the form of support for universities
and higher learning institutes.
Additional to these ‘enabling changes’, it seems adequate to abolish the security
for private seed enterprises that all produced seed is bought by the government. As
long as seed companies do not need to use entrepreneurial spirit and design
competitive firm strategies, many of them may remain in their cushy position in
which no huge profits are made but the government organizes the marketing and
covers much of the risks.
If seed markets are liberalized and the centralized distribution system is replaced
by free market competition, access to seed for the poorest may be at stake. Thus, in
a transition phase in which seed supply is not enough to meet demand and the
private sector focuses on farmers who are better-off and easier to reach, the public
seed enterprises can cater to the poorest, as, according to their statutes, they do not
need to make profits. Alternatively, subsidies for the marginalized poor and invest-
ment incentives for companies may be temporary measures to ameliorate
inequalities.
In the long term, however, private and public seed companies should compete
for better quality and lower prices, both catering to the marginalized poor and to
non-poor farmers. However, since the poor are the largest customer group in the
country in terms of the number of people and, if they have access to credit, also in
terms of the amount of inputs bought, it will be crucial for companies to cater to the
poor if the largest part of the Ethiopian market is to be developed for the future.
How Can These Changes Be Brought About?
Having identified some potentially fruitful institutional innovations, the question
arises as to how these changes could be brought about. It is unlikely that the private
seed companies can establish a lobby group that bargains with one voice for market
liberalization any time soon. Yet, to change institutions, a critical mass of agents is
needed that together can reach a certain size in terms of market share or political
importance and collectively work towards an institutional change (Acquaye-
Baddoo et al. 2010). At the moment, the private seed companies do not seem to
have this critical mass and it is not clear whether or how many of them really aim at
changing the system.
Thus, while companies can still be expected to push for changes, the current
situation and the self-conception of the Ethiopian government require the govern-
ment to be in the lead. This then entails the question as to what could motivate the
GoE to enact market liberalizing changes. Several factors may be important in this
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regard, most notably successful role models, support by other stakeholders and
successes with investment incentive schemes in other sectors in the country.
Successful role models are certainly conducive for the government to enact
changes. However, while neighbouring countries operate under similar initial
conditions, so far, they have not successfully managed the transition to a liberalized
market either (Ngugi 2002; Tripp and Rohrbach 2001). A more promising example
would be China, which also comes closer to the development path aspired to by the
Ethiopian government. China started from similar preconditions and was successful
in increasing seed production by encouraging private sector investments and
ensuring a division of labour between public and private enterprises for tasks like
seed breeding and training of breeders (Cabral et al. 2006; Meng et al. 2006; Park
2008; Peoples Republic of China State Council 2013).
Not only the Chinese but also the German seed sector may be of some relevance
for Ethiopia. The German seed industry is – similar to the Ethiopian case – built up
of mainly medium-sized companies. About 130 plant breeding and seed trading
companies operate in Germany, 60 of them with their own breeding programs. Most
of the seed producing and trading companies are organized in regional associations
and under a national umbrella association, the German Plant Breeders’ Association.
This umbrella association is the central part of a network that serves as a platform
for pre-competitive joint research projects, patent issues, and public variety testing,
as well as for safeguarding plant variety protection (http://www.bdp-online.de/en/).
The German example is relevant to the Ethiopian case in as much as it shows that
market consolidation can be avoided (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004).
Apart from learning from role models, cooperation between governments can
help to facilitate the entry of private companies into the market. Furthermore,
support can be expected from international organizations like AGRA (http://agra-
alliance.org) and the Integrated Seed System Development Project (http://www.
issdethiopia.org), or initiatives like the New Vision for Agriculture, the New Alli-
ance for Food Security and Nutrition and Feed the Future (http://www.
feedthefuture.gov) that are ready to support the government in market liberalization
efforts.
In addition to these sources of support, cooperation and support from NGOs is
needed as well. The distribution of free seed by relief organizations or even by
public entities in the context of agricultural development programs has been
identified as one of the most serious constraints to seed system development
(Tripp and Rohrbach 2001).
And finally, successful experiences from other sectors of the economy, espe-
cially other subsectors of agriculture, may motivate the government to support
private sector investments. Such positive experiences can be drawn from the flower
sector, where investments have been attracted by the government. Thanks to these
programs, flower production increased significantly in the last two decades (Ayele
2006; see also e.g. The Embassy of Ethiopia in China 2013).
Another very important factor is the change in informal institutions. In Ethiopia,
many parts of society are still considerably shaped by the country’s socialist past.
Entrepreneurial spirit is not very common ([5]), and scepticism concerning business
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and the belief in a state-directed economy are still common among government
employees. But if the private sector is meant to increase operations, support needs
to come from all levels of government and other parts of society, from universities
to banks to consumers.
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